Introduction
In May 2007, the relatively unknown Brazilian firm JBS acquired Colorado-based Swift & Co for $1.4 billion and suddenly became the largest beef processing company in the world. Two years later, in September 2009, JBS made another surprising move by acquiring Pilgrim's Pride, an iconic American meat processing firm, for $2.8 billion.
Where had a rather unknown Brazilian firm gotten the funds to finance such acquisitions? The answer was simple. The Brazilian National Development Bank (known in Portuguese as BNDES) had singled out JBS as a "national champion" and provided funding to make it a dominant player in the global beef and poultry market.
Thanks to its $4 billion investments in JBS, BNDES eventually controlled 30.4 percent of the firm's shares, becoming its largest minority shareholder and, in turn, a minority shareholder of both Swift and Pilgrim's Pride. 1 These transactions, like many others conducted by governments and development banks around the world, raised interesting questions. Should governments use development banks, such as BNDES, to to support firms? Should governments support firms by becoming minority shareholders? What are the implications of such investments for firms and for countries as a whole?
In July 2010, while the JBS story was unfolding in Brazil, a consortium of investment banks on the other side of the world launched the initial public offering (IPO) of Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) on the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges. ABC had traditionally been a "policy bank"; that is, a bank that lent according to the interests of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, by 2008 , over 25 percent of its loans were nonperforming. To fix ABC before the IPO, the government bailed out the bank, cleaned up its balance sheet, and revamped its processes and governance.
Investor interest was enormous. This was the largest IPO in the world at the time; it raised almost $22 billion for shares-15 percent of the firm's capital-and share value rose to almost 30 percent above the issuing price in a couple of months. Yet it was not clear if the investors who bought the shares knew what they were getting into. Were they misguided? Could the Chinese government be trusted as a majority investor?
In both cases, investors were faced with something that was clearly state capitalism, but was clearly not the state capitalism they were used to. In this book, we study the rise of these new forms of state capitalism in which the state works hand in hand with private investors in novel governance arrangements. We define state capitalism as the widespread influence of the government in the economy, either by owning majority or minority equity positions in companies or by providing subsidized credit and/or other privileges to private companies. The new varieties of state capitalism differ from the more traditional model in which governments own and manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 2 as extensions of the public bureaucracy. We refer to this traditional model as Leviathan as an entrepreneur.
We identify two new models of state capitalism that go beyond the Leviathan as an entrepreneur model. In the Leviathan as a majority investor model, as in the example of Agricultural Bank of China, the state is still the controlling shareholder but SOEs have distinct governance traits that allow for the participation of private investors. In the Leviathan as a minority investor model, state capitalism adopts a more hybrid form in which the state relinquishes control of its enterprises to private investors but remains present through minority equity investments by pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and the government itself. In the latter model, we also include the provision of loans to private firms by development banks and other state-owned financial institutions. In our view, then, the rise of national champions such as JBS, whose expansion was based on subsidized capital from its home government, is a manifestation of the Leviathan as a minority investor model. 3 The examples of Agricultural Bank of China and JBS are by no means curious exceptions. By some calculations, firms under government control account for one-fifth of the world's total stock market capitalization. 4 In Italy, for example, SOEs listed on the stock exchange (both majority-and minority-owned by the government) account for over 20 percent of stock market capitalization. In Greece, this figure is 30 percent, while in the Netherlands and Sweden it is closer to 5 percent (OECD 2005, 35) . In large markets, such as Russia and Brazil, companies controlled by the government or in which the government has a significant stake dominate trading and they account for between 30 and 40 percent of market capitalization. In China, companies in which the government is a controlling shareholder account for over 60 percent of stock market capitalization. 5 Furthermore, in our analysis of SOEs in myriad emerging countries (see Chapter 2), the Leviathan as a minority investor model is prevalent and covers about 20-30 percent of the companies in which the government has equity (the rest being majority-owned SOEs). Finally, we also do not claim that the new varieties of state capitalism are universally better than the previous varieties. We explicitly warn that the new varieties also have limits when it comes to taming the government's temptation to intervene politically in a firm. In the model in which Leviathan is a majority investor, for instance, the government is still a controlling shareholder and, absent checks and balances, it may be drawn to intervene in strategic sectors such as energy, mining, and utilities. In the model in which Leviathan is a minority shareholder, equity investments or loan disbursements may actually benefit politically connected capitalists rather than financially constrained firms.
The Reinvention of State Capitalism
How 12 In fact, the process of learning and experimentation with SOE reform does not seem that long when compared to the slow process of transformation of the corporate governance regime of the largest corporations in the United States. At the turn of the twenty-first century investors were still surprised by corporate scandals, by outrageous executive compensation packages, by boards of directors that were not monitoring managers effectively, etc. For a discussion of this process of transformation in private firms see Chapter 3 of (Khurana 2002).
13 Some papers comparing the performance of SOEs and private firms acknowledge that there are different forms of state ownership. They usually divide SOEs into (fully) state-owned, SOEs with private ownership, and private firms and they usually find that private firms are consistently found to perform best of all (Boardman and Vining 1989; Gupta 2005; Dewenter and Malatesta 2001). These works, however, do not look at the variation in the corporate governance arrangements of privatized firms. They also ignore the implications of minority ownership. Minority state participation in corporations is increasing worldwide. We argue that there are several channels through which states act as minority shareholders, such as directly holding residual shares in partially privatized firms and using state-owned holding companies to hold minority stakes in a variety of firms controlled by private investors. In this model, we also see governments using development banks, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), and other state-controlled funds (such as pension funds and life insurance investments) to either lend to or invest in private companies. In India, for instance, the Life Insurance Corporation practically acts as a holding company for the government, with around $50 billion invested as of September 2011. In Brazil, as the JBS example shows, the national development bank (BNDES) has actively poured money into local corporations.
Leviathan as an entrepreneur
As a way to summarize the differences across the distinct models of state capitalism, Table 1 -1 explains the main sources of inefficiency in SOEs according to the agency, the social, and the political views and how those inefficiencies might be addressed by the Leviathan as a majority and minority investor models. Board of directors with some independent members and some political appointees; depending on numbers, it can act as a balance to the government and the CEO. Yet, government can co-opt board members.
Boards as principals of the CEO (monitoring/punishing).
Government uses SOEs to smooth business cycles (e.g., hiring more or firing fewer workers than necessary).
Effect is reduced if the firm is isolated from political intervention.
Low political interference in management, except for industries in which the government has temptation to intervene (e.g., natural resource sectors) and when the government colludes with other minority shareholders. Soft-budget constraint (bailouts).
No clear risk of bankruptcy (governments will likely bail them out).
Hard-budget constraint unless firm is singled out as a national champion. Then maybe bailout because firm it "too big or important to fail." Agency view Management has lowpowered incentives.
Pay-for-performance contracts, bonuses, and stock options more likely (incentives may not be as high-powered as in private firms).
High-powered incentives.
Hard to measure performance (financial measures are not enough, not easy to measure social and political goals).
Stock prices and financial ratios as performance metrics. Customer satisfaction and feedback to measure quality of goods and/or services.
Stock prices and financial ratios as key performance metrics.
(Continues) We are nevertheless cautious because, even if these new models of state capitalism have improved incentives and monitoring inside the firm and have, in some cases, insulated SOEs from outright political interference, governments still can and often do intervene. These new models have their limits and can break down when the government's temptation to intervene is at its highest; for example, during a major economic crisis or in advance of a hotly contested election. As we discuss throughout the book, reducing political intervention in the model in which the government is a majority shareholder or reducing agency problems in the model in which the government is a minority shareholder will depend not only the private enforcement of investor rights (e.g., through the firm's own statutes and through the ability of stock markets and rating agencies to prevent the abuse of minority shareholders), but also on legal protections and regulatory provisions that tie the hands of governments and avoid discretionary interference. . 17 We do not examine commercial banks in detail in this book because they are mainly focused on providing credit to households or working capital to firms. We are, instead, interested in looking at development banks, which provide long-term loans to promote industrialization or the construction of infrastructure and, thus, tend to be intimately linked to the process of economic development (Amsden 2001).
Brazil as a Case Study
Although we present a general discussion of the new forms of state capitalism, most of our detailed empirical studies of the implications of these new forms rely on firm-level data for Brazil. We think Brazil is a good setting in which to study the evolution of state capitalism for two reasons. 
Our General Argument
Our book makes three broad arguments. First, we argue that governments have learned that they need more sustainable ownership schemes and corporate governance regimes for SOEs. Our historical narrative maintains that as a consequence of the crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s the model of government ownership and management of SOEs became too inefficient and turned into a burden on the public finances.
Governments restructured their portfolio of firms, privatizing those in which they had no policy reason to operate and changing the ownership structure of many in which they did want to keep an interest (for example, strategic firms with high rents from oil, mining, and utilities). Yet, some states learned that in order to have more sustainable models for these firms, they needed to get the private sector involved in monitoring and funding SOEs as well as in sharing the losses of these enterprises. That meant the state had to share both the management and the rents. Second, instead of debating whether state or private ownership are universally superior, we submit that there is much heterogeneity within each model of ownership.
That is, part of our argument is that there is too much variation to generalize. Granted, we still find poorly managed SOEs subject to political interference, but we also find many SOEs that changed their governance practices and in which the government acts like an investor rather than a manager. Likewise, we find many instances of minority state ownership which actually help firms develop new, profitable projects, alongside instances of unjustified support to politically-connected national champions. See for instance in Figure 1 .2 the wide variation in performance in private firms and firms in which the government is a majority and minority shareholder. In sum, a generic attempt to answer whether state ownership is good or bad will necessarily miss the nuance and variation of organizational forms that emerged from the reinvention of state capitalism documented in this book. We essentially pursue an exercise of finding sources of firm-level heterorgeneity across SOEs.
Third, we argue that the new models of state ownership, which we call Leviathan as a majority and minority investors, will more effectively work depending on a host of conditions that are detailed throughout the book and summarized in our conclusion chapter. For instance, if full privatization of an SOE is not an option, then a government can-and should-at least improve that SOE's governance protections in order to mitigate agency and political intervention problems. We argue that the new models of state ownership will be more effective when they have corporate governance arrangements that prevent abuses by the controlling shareholders -not only when the government is the majority investor, but also when the government is a minority investor and private parties are able to tunnel founds out of the SOE. Thus, when adopting the model in which Leviathan is a minority investor, we argue that governments should target private firms with good governance and with severe financial constraints. Over time, as local capital markets become more developed, the state should progressively exit and leave state participation for cases in which the financing of projects with high spillovers are too risky or hard to execute for private capitalists.
Put another way, the counterfactual of our argument for the Leviathan as a majority investor model is that, without checks and balances on the abuses of the government as a controlling shareholder, even listed SOEs, with minority private ownership, could end up becoming the inefficient SOEs of the past, with controlled prices, excessive debt, and endless needs for the treasury to cover their losses. That is, if the government tunnels out the rents and violates its partnership with the private sector, it may well scare away investors and go back to where it was in the 1980s.
Our counterfactual for the minority investor model is more complex. We argue that having the government investing in or lending to firms that have investment opportunities but that are not financially constrained will not compensate the opportunity cost of the government funds. Governments would therefore be better off using their investment arms to prop up financially-constrained firms with latent capabilities, instead of large groups or national champions with ability to fund their own projects through internal capital markets. Furthermore, when financial markets are more developed, government investments in equity may be necessary only for firms that would never be financed by the private sector; for example, small and medium-size enterprises with complex projects that are either too risky or too difficult to be financed by private financial intermediaries.
We have tried to keep the methodological and narrative approaches of the book as broad as possible to facilitate a conversation with a broad set of fields. Still, we have been as strict as possible in our empirical work to try to convince skeptics of our arguments. Notwithstanding such efforts, there will be readers who will not be convinced by our statistical work simply because governments do not choose to own firms or intervene in private companies at random; that is, there is no natural experiment in this book. For that reason, we are very conscious that our work may suffer from selection bias problems and that our results should be interpreted carefully as we are not uncovering causality in the purest sense. In every chapter in which we deal with statistical work we have included a section explaining how selection bias may affect our results and we have added a series of tests to minimize it or, when possible, guarantee that it is not driving our results. For instance, if we study the effect of government equity investments on the performance and capital expenditure of private firms we make sure to examine what firm characteristics drive the selection of firms-to discard the possibility that governments are choosing high performing firms ex ante.
We also use matching techniques and other robustness checks to make sure our results are not purely driven by selection bias.
Overview of the Book
The first three chapters elaborate our argument in a general way, describing the global history of state capitalism and offering possible explanations for the origins and implications of the new models of state capitalism. Chapter 2 is an historical account of the rise, fall, and reinvention of state capitalism around the world in the twentieth century. We describe the efforts of governments in Europe and developing countries at various times to improve SOE performance and emphasize the evolution of state capitalism as a process of learning, of trial and error, and largely as a response to economic shocks. We end the story by explaining how the crisis of the Leviathan as an entrepreneur model led to the privatization policies of the 1990s.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature and the implications that each view of SOEs has for each of the ownership models we study. These views are building blocks for the testable hypotheses proposed in the subsequent chapters..
In Chapter 4, we begin using Brazil as a case study. We first describe in detail the macroeconomic story that led to the reinvention of state capitalism there in the 1980s and 1990s and explore some of the variation within Brazilian SOEs. We also describe the transformation of SOEs in Brazil after the privatization process.
In Chapter 5, we study CEOs as a source of variation in SOE performance. In the Leviathan as an entrepreneur model, governments had few levers to influence the performance of SOEs. Therefore, governments tended to replace CEOs whenever they wanted to change the performance of these firms. Yet, those efforts seem to have been futile as we show that CEOs actually had very little influence over the performance of SOEs, except for top executives who attended elite universities. Those elite CEOs actually led firms to have better performance than the average state-owned firm. Chapter 10 introduces a discussion of the role of development banks and provides a historical narrative of the role played by BNDES for the industrialization of Brazil. Using data from 2002 to 2009, Chapter 11 shows that BNDES is lending to large firms which should be able to get capital elsewhere. We also shed light on the process through which the bank selects its target firms.
